




NAVIGATING THE RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY ILL AND THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT: DEFINING RESPONSIBILITY, 




Acts of violence committed with firearms, and mass shootings in par-
ticular, remain a central policy dilemma for American society.  Executive 
orders and a variety of legislative proposals at the local, state and federal 
level, have been considered to reduce the incidence of such criminal activi-
ty.  A significant portion of the public, expert, and political debate revolves 
around the interplay of mental health issues and gun violence.  At heart is 
the challenging empirical question about what percentage of violent gun 
crime, and the most serious form, the mass shooting, is causally related to 
the mental health of the perpetrator.  At one end of the spectrum, in a wide-
ly debated 2013 article, conservative political writer Ann Coulter asserted 
“Guns don’t kill people—the mentally ill do.”1  This sentiment was echoed 
again, more recently, after the mass shooting in San Bernardino, California, 
when former Speaker of the House, Paul Ryan, stated: “People with mental 
illness are getting guns and committing these mass shootings.”2  A striking 
number of Americans believe mass shootings primarily reflect problems 
with mental illness.3  This causal perspective directly impacts the legal and 
policy options favored to remedy the problem.  Policies stressing mental 
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 1 Ann Coulter, Guns Don’t Kill People, the Mentally Ill Do, ANN COULTER (Jan. 16, 2013), 
http://www.anncoulter.com/columns/2013-01-16.html. 
 2 Donovan Slack et al., Republicans Say No to New Gun Control Legislation after San Bernardino, 
USA TODAY (Dec. 3, 2015), http://usat.ly/1QhantN. 
 3 Peyton M. Craighill & Scott Clement, What Americans Blame Most for Mass Shootings (Hint: 
It’s Not Gun Laws), WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2015/10/26/gun-control-americans-overwhelmingly-blame-mental-health-failures-for-
mass-shootings/ (“By a more than 2-to-1 margin, more people say mass shootings reflect prob-
lems identifying and treating people with mental health problems rather than inadequate gun con-
trol laws.”). 
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health treatment and controlling the mentally ill person’s access to guns 
take precedence over more general gun control laws seeking to limit or re-
strict access generally.4  This controversy over the role mental illness plays 
in gun violence is not a novel debate.5  Although mental illness is not a sig-
nificant factor in most violent acts in modern society,6 recent policy discus-
sion and legislation have frequently focused on means to restrict the rights 
of people with mental illness to possess a firearm in hopes of curbing this 
particular type of violent act. 
These desires for more severe restrictions on a subset of the population 
largely stem from public reaction to mass shootings perpetrated by gun vio-
lence, and the degree to which the reported increase in mass shootings7 can 
be blamed on the allegedly “unstable” portion of the American population 
suffering from serious mental illnesses, such as bipolar depression and 
schizophrenia.  Legislative proposals based on this policy view require bal-
ancing the professed goal of greater public safety against the constitutional 
rights of mentally ill persons—including under the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment—and the right to bear arms under the Se-
cond Amendment.  While the new administration is currently working to 
alter federal laws regarding the mentally ill and the Second Amendment, 
some states have chosen to enact legislation that seeks to categorically ban 
anyone with a mental illness from obtaining a firearm.  Such legislation is 
both unconstitutional and unwise, as it places excessive responsibility on 
mental health professionals as “arbiters” of constitutional rights and, ulti-
mately, legal culpability—a decision that should be left to the courts and 
legislature.  This legislation uses mental health professionals’ clinical diag-
noses, which are often not valid or reliable, as tools to predict future vio-
lence and, therefore, ban certain individuals from purchasing firearms. 
 
 4 See id. (showing 63% of respondents blamed a deficient mental health care system as the prime 
reason for gun violence, while 23% pointed to weak gun regulations). 
 5 For proof that the debate on responsibility and the rights of people with mental illness to possess 
firearms has been waged for decades, see L.A. Rotenberg & Robert L. Sadoff, Who Should Have 
a Gun? Some Preliminary Psychiatric Thoughts, 125 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 841, 842 (1968) (dis-
cussing ways to assess whether mental patients were “of sound mind” enough to possess fire-
arms). 
 6 See Editorial, Don’t Blame Mental Illness for Gun Violence, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/16/opinion/don’t-blame-mental-illness-for-gun-violence.html 
(explaining the common belief that mental illness is equivalent to a propensity for violence is un-
supported by evidence). 
 7 See A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States Between 2000 and 2013, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE: FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Sept. 16, 2013), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/ 
  2014/september/fbi-releases-study-on-active-shooter-incidents/pdfs/a-study-of-active-shooter-
incidents-in-the-u.s.-between-2000-and-2013 (suggesting a sharp rise in mass shootings since 
2000). 
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A mere diagnosis of even a serious mental disorder by a mental health 
professional does not necessarily equate to violent tendencies.8  Psycholo-
gists or clinical professionals are rarely able to predict which of their pa-
tients will or will not exhibit future risks of gun violence with the certainty 
necessary for this policy approach to be effective.  While neuropredic-
tion—“or the belief that one can predict individual behavior from neurosci-
entific data”—is becoming increasingly popular in United States court-
rooms,9 neuroscientists have yet to develop a sufficient understanding of 
the cause of many serious mental health issues.  The neuropsychology and 
psychology fields remain marked with inaccuracy in diagnoses and une-
venness in treatment, reflecting that a mental health practitioner’s opinion 
is often shaped by his or her own experiences and beliefs.10 
Most importantly, the inability of mental health experts to predict the 
progression of a disorder, both in terms of neuroprediction and more tradi-
tional diagnosis, and the future impact of treatment, directly impacts such 
legislative proposals.  Unlike policies permitting health care practitioners to 
seek involuntary commitment for inpatient treatment for those patients who 
present an imminent danger to themselves or others, the broadly restrictive 
access policy has no element of imminence and instead assumes that the 
diagnosis will equate to a sufficient risk.11  Thus, such legislation in es-
sence allows fear, however understandable, to create policy that, as schol-
ars have noted, is both too broad and too narrow: too broad because it im-
plicates a large number of individuals, who are clinically diagnosed as 
having mental illness, but will never commit acts of violence; and too nar-
row because it excludes potentially dangerous individuals who have not 
been diagnosed by a clinical professional.12  In turn it implicates the rights 
of the mentally ill under both the Second Amendment and equal protection 
doctrine.  Finally, it risks further propagating the negative stigma which 
could discourage mentally ill people from seeking proper treatment. 
 
 8 Jessica Rosenberg, Mass Shootings and Mental Health Policy, 41 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 107, 
109 (2014). 
 9 See Judith Edersheim et al., Can Neuroscience Predict Human Behavior?, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/judith-g-edersheim-jd-md/traumatic-brain-
injury_b_2296203.html (discussing the increasing use of neuroscientific data in court cases). 
 10 Id. 
 11 See, e.g., Involuntary Outpatient Commitment Summary of State Statutes, BAZELON CTR. FOR 
MENTAL HEALTH LAW (Apr. 2000), http://www.bazelon.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=CBm 
  FgyA4i-w%3D&tabid=324 (illustrating a collection of state civil commitment statutes).  See also 
Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Reasons, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 189, 211 (1999) (“For another 
example, suppose the delusional self-defender or businessperson has not yet acted but the threat 
of danger or improvidence looms.  Because they nonresponsibly threaten legally relevant behav-
ior, the law may intervene by involuntary civil commitment or by guardianship, respectively.”). 
 12 Fredrick E. Vars & Amanda Adcock Young, Do the Mentally Ill Have a Right to Bear Arms?, 48 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 3–24 (2013). 
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Part I of this Comment will explore the current laws, introduce the rele-
vant guiding federal statutory law on this topic, and discuss the leading Su-
preme Court cases addressing the set of issues involving Second Amend-
ment rights, equal protection, and the ability to impose restrictions on the 
mentally ill.  It will then discuss state laws, exploring the three main ap-
proaches states take in this debate.  Part II will then delve into the range of 
restrictive approaches adopted by states, including the most restrictive stat-
utes that ban “anyone with a mental illness” from owning a gun, exploring 
how “mental illness” is defined under these laws, and who is made respon-
sible for identifying, categorizing or diagnosing the mental illness.  It will 
address why such quasi-categorical exclusion approaches are unconstitu-
tional, in part, by looking at the variability and imprecision of mental 
health diagnosis, explored through important lessons derived from recent 
advances in cognitive psychology and neuroscience.  The section will also 
explore the implications stemming from the continual arguments surround-
ing what it means for a person to be legally responsible despite having doc-
umented mental health issues, and explore the evidence addressing the de-
gree to which mental illness can be directly correlated to a propensity for 
serious violence—especially over long periods.  Lastly, it will address both 
Second Amendment and equal protection arguments regarding restrictive 
state approaches.  Finally, Part II.C will suggest alternative models em-
ployed currently by few states, such as behavioral or symptoms-based ap-
proaches and actuarial prediction models, as better methods to protect not 
only the individual’s civil liberties, but also the community. 
I.  DISCUSSION OF CURRENT LAWS 
The evolution of gun laws in this country mirrors the fluctuating pool of 
public opinion towards violence and weapons.13  While many of the recent 
changes in gun control legislation have occurred on the state level,14 the 
 
 13 After a mass shooting, public opinion polls show an increased demand for stricter gun control, 
which tapers off after some time has passed.  See, e.g., Louise Witt, In Wake of San Bernardino 
Mass Shooting, 80% of Americans Want Tougher Gun Laws AND Believe NRA Policies ‘Make 
All Americans Safer’, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ 
  national/calif-shooting-80-america-tougher-gun-laws-article-1.2453721 (finding an overwhelm-
ing number of the people polled after the San Bernardino shooting demanding stricter gun con-
trols).  See also Francie Diep, Do Americans Care More About Gun Control After Mass Shoot-
ings?, PAC. STANDARD (Dec. 3, 2015), https://psmag.com/do-americans-care-more-about-gun-
control-after-mass-shootings-45f9ce3a690#.6us0d45kt (noting the killings at Sandy Hook Ele-
mentary School in 2012 “…triggered a flurry of legislative activity and pushed public support for 
stricter gun laws up by 10 percent.  Since then, however, support for gun-control laws has once 
again tapered off.”). 
 14 See Possession of Firearms by People with Mental Illness, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 13, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/ 
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federal government has also played an important part in establishing gun 
control boundaries for the mentally ill. 
The right to bear arms is guaranteed by the Second Amendment of the 
United States Constitution which provides: “A well regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and 
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”15  The Framers of the Constitution 
wanted to ensure that in this newly-formed state, Americans would have 
the same rights they did as Englishmen.16  “When the colonists began to 
rise up against British authority, early American revolutionaries were de-
nied these basic rights, including that to carry firearms.”17  The right to bear 
arms, therefore, was seen as a necessity to preserve the early colonists’ 
freedom, as well as a symbol of independence.  Because this right was es-
tablished in the context of a militia, some scholars and citizens argued that 
the Second Amendment only applied to the rights of citizens to take up 
arms in a militia or during war time.  In District of Columbia v. Heller, the 
Supreme Court rejected that notion, clarifying that the Second Amendment 
encompasses a right for the individual to possess a firearm—in times of 
war or peace.18  While many find it difficult to imagine a revolutionary 
scenario like that of 1776 reoccurring, many Americans still believe the 
Second Amendment is a necessary element to protect citizens from a mod-
ern-day type of tyranny.19  However, even when the Constitution was being 
signed, the right to own a firearm was not without limits.20  Today, both the 
Supreme Court, and, arguably, Congress have established checks and con-
trols that suggest this right is not absolute. 
A.  The Supreme Court 
Although the Second Amendment undoubtedly guarantees that the right 
to own firearms shall not be infringed—a concept that has become in-
grained in American culture—the right to bear arms is often not afforded 
 
  possession-of-a-firearm-by-the-mentally-ill.aspx (providing a collection of all state laws regard-
ing mentally ill and firearm possession). 
 15 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 16 Talal Al-Khatib, Why Do We Have the Second Amendment?, DISCOVERY NEWS (Dec. 28, 2012, 
6:39 AM), http://news.discovery.com/human/the-historical-origin-of-the-second-amendment-
121228.htm. 
 17 Id. 
 18 554 U.S. 570, 613–14 (2008). 
 19 See Nelson Lund & Adam Winkler, Common Interpretation: The Second Amendment, NAT’L 
CONST. CTR., http://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendments/amendment- ii 
(last visited Jan. 21, 2017) (discussing the history of the Second Amendment and justifications 
for its relevance today). 
 20 See Al-Khatib, supra note 16 (discussing the checks and balances placed on gun ownership when 
the Second Amendment was enacted). 
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strict constitutional scrutiny typical of most fundamental rights.21  Moreo-
ver, while recent opinions by the Supreme Court, at first glance, seem to 
suggest that this is a right guaranteed to all people, in dicta, the Court has 
suggested that certain groups of people, including the mentally ill, have 
limited gun rights.22  The leading case addressing this issue is the United 
States Supreme Court’s 2008 decision, District of Columbia v. Heller.23  In 
Heller, the Court stated and implied multiple times that all Americans have 
a right to bear arms: “What is more, in all six other provisions of the Con-
stitution that mention ‘the people,’ the term unambiguously refers to all 
members of the political community, not an unspecified subset.”24  Howev-
er, the Court continued to say “nothing in our opinion should be taken to 
cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons and the mentally ill” as “presumptively lawful regulatory 
measures.”25  Since Heller, these restrictions pertaining to mental illness 
have, historically, been widely upheld.26 
After Heller, a sharp split of authority arose as to which level of scruti-
ny applies to statutes that affect mentally ill Americans’ right to bear 
arms.27  According to some scholars, “[t]he Heller majority did not adopt a 
specific level of scrutiny for evaluating gun restrictions but expressly re-
jected the rational-basis test.”28  Justice Breyer’s dissent argued that the 
majority implicitly rejected strict scrutiny by listing valid restrictions that 
would likely fail such a standard.29  “But because the felon exception, 
paired with mental illness by Heller, is almost certainly not narrowly tai-
lored to a compelling state interest, strict scrutiny cannot be the relevant 
test.”30  Thus, remaining possible tests include: “(1) reasonableness, (2) in-
 
 21 See Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing Clark v. Jeter, 
486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“[C]lassifications affecting fundamental rights are given the most ex-
acting scrutiny.”)). 
 22 Heller, 554 U.S. at 579, 626. 
 23 Id. at 570. 
 24 Id. at 580. 
 25 Id. at 626, 627 n.26. 
 26 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) (“We made it clear in Heller that 
our holding did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as ‘prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.’”). 
 27 For a general overview of different approaches to the constitutional standard, see Vars & Young, 
supra note 12, at 3–24 (discussing different interpretations of the standard); see also Heller, 554 
U.S. at 688 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (omitting mental illness from his list of Second Amendment 
restrictions as likely to fail a heightened standard of review, and thus suggesting that it could 
survive even a strict scrutiny analysis); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 
433 (1985) (discussing the heightened rational basis standard of review for mentally ill persons). 
 28 Vars & Young, supra note 12, at 7. 
 29 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 688 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 30 Vars & Young, supra note 12, at 7–8; see also Stephen Kiehl, Comment, In Search of a Stand-
ard: Gun Regulations After Heller and McDonald, 70 MD. L. REV. 1131, 1156–57, 1157 n.227 
(2011). 
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termediate scrutiny, and (3) some hybrid.”31  A reasonableness standard 
would mean: “[A]ny law that is a ‘reasonable regulation’ of the arms right 
is constitutionally permissible.”32  A few circuits have adopted the second 
proposed standard: intermediate scrutiny.33  This “would require that a re-
striction upon the gun rights of the mentally ill would have to be substan-
tially related to an important government objective.”34  Lastly, a hybrid ap-
proach of the above could be utilized, with limitless hypothetical options.35 
While some scholars contend that, despite dicta in the dissenting opin-
ion in Heller that might have suggested otherwise,36 strict scrutiny should 
not be applied to these issues.  However, in a later case, McDonald v. City 
of Chicago, the Supreme Court characterized the right to keep and bear 
arms as fundamental,37 which many state courts then interpreted as saying 
such laws should be subject to strict scrutiny.38  The applicable standard 
clearly has a significant impact on the ability of the measure to pass consti-
tutional muster. 
B.  Federal Statutes 
While the Supreme Court’s position on the issue of firearms and the 
mentally ill has been debated for decades,39 Congress has taken a much 
stronger stance on the topic.  In fact, the new administration has promised 
to make significant changes to existing federal mental health laws.  How-
ever, to understand those new changes, it is important to briefly look at the 
history of federal gun control legislation. 
In 1968, Congress enacted the Federal Gun Control Act of 1968 
(“GCA”) which provides: “It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or 
otherwise dispose of any firearm or ammunition to any person” who “has 
 
 31 Vars & Young, supra note 12, at 8. 
 32 Id. 
 33 For example, the Seventh Circuit applies intermediate scrutiny.  See United States v. Skoien, 614 
F.3d 638, 641–42 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (finding need for “some form of strong showing”). 
 34 Vars & Young, supra note 12, at 9. 
 35 Id. at 10.  These include a hybrid of intermediate and strict scrutiny, as well as more complicated 
categorical justifications.  Id. 
 36 Id. at 7–8. 
 37 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 746 (2010). 
 38 See, e.g., Missouri Supreme Court Applies Strict Scrutiny to Gun Case, Upholds Ban on Felon-
in-Possession, NRA-ILA (Aug. 21, 2015), https://www.nraila.org/articles/20150821/missouri-
supreme-court-applies-strict-scrutiny-to-gun-case-upholds-ban-on-felon-in-possession (“[C]ases 
that arose after McDonald under Missouri’s right to arms would be subject to strict scruti-
ny. . . . [T]he Missouri Supreme Court viewed Amendment 5 as ‘a declaration of the law as it 
would have been declared by this Court after McDonald mandated that the fundamental right to 
bear arms applied to the states.’”). 
 39 See Vars & Young, supra note 12, at 3–24; District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 688 
(2008); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 433 (1985). 
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been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to any 
mental institution.”40  “Adjudicated as a mental defective” is defined:  
(a) A determination by a court, board, commission, or other lawful authority 
that a person, as a result of marked subnormal intelligence, or mental illness, 
incompetency, condition, or disease: (1) Is a danger to himself or to others; or 
(2) Lacks the mental capacity to contract or manage his own affairs.  (b) The 
terms shall include—(1) A finding of insanity by a court in a criminal case, and 
(2) Those persons found incompetent to stand trial or found guilty by reason of 
lack of mental responsibility.41   
Commitment decisions must be made through a formal hearing process, un-
less a person voluntarily enters a mental institution “for observation.”42  
Over the years, Congress has continued to pass laws which pose stricter 
limits on gun possession for Americans, and in particular, for individuals 
with signs of a mental illness.  However, as will be discussed later, this 
trend may change due to the new administration. 
The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (“Brady Act”),43 passed 
in 1994, amended the GCA and established stricter gun control measures.44  
Some of these measures included mandatory waiting periods between ap-
plying for ownership and purchase, mandatory National Instant Criminal 
Background Check System (“NICS”) background checks to purchase a 
firearm, and the establishment of the NICS Index, which was created with 
the intention of disqualifying any individual with a mental illness history 
from accessing dangerous weapons.45  The NICS Index contains infor-
mation provided by local, state, tribal, and federal agencies of persons pro-
hibited from receiving firearms under federal or state law.46  An individual 
is immediately disqualified from purchasing or owning a firearm if he or 
she is a match on the NICS Index.  However, the Index, and the Brady Act 
generally, were broadly criticized for being ineffective because originally 
 
 40 Federal Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(d)(4) (2012). 
 41 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2017); see also BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND 
EXPLOSIVES, GUN CONTROL ACT, https://www.atf.gov/rules-and-regulations/gun-control-act 
(last updated Sept. 22, 2016) (discussing how the GCA limits access to firearms by “prohibited 
persons”). 
 42 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(4), 924(a)(2) (2012). 
 43 Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–922). 
 44 Most notably, the Brady Act was a response to the shooting of President Reagan.  See November 
30, 1993: Brady Bill Signed Into Law, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-
history/brady-bill-signed-into-law (last visited Jan. 9, 2017) (discussing the death of Press Secre-
tary James Brady and the Brady Act).  For more information on the Brady Act, see WILLIAM J. 
KROUSE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32842, GUN CONTROL LEGISLATION 25–30, (2012) (dis-
cussing the history of the legislation, its specific provisions, and data related to its enforcement). 
 45 M. Roxana Nahhas Rudolph, Balancing Public Safety with the Rights of the Mentally Ill: The 
Benefit of a Behavioral Approach in Reducing Gun Violence in Tennessee, 45 U. MEM. L. REV. 
671, 679–80 (2015). 
 46 National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) Operations, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE:  FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (2015). 
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the Index was comprised only of information voluntarily submitted by state 
and federal agencies.47 
Due to lack of contributions to the Index, Congress passed the NICS 
Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 (“Improvement Act”).48  The Im-
provement Act sought to eliminate inconsistent reporting by providing both 
positive and negative incentives—encouraging states to accurately report 
all persons with federal disqualifications to the NICS Index.  Some of those 
incentives included “awarding grants to fund creation and maintenance of 
state databases and imposing fines for failure to comply.”49 
Recently, news and media outlets have dubbed 2015 the “year of the 
mass shootings,” with some news outlets reporting more than 350 mass 
shootings in the year alone.50  However, other outlets have reported as little 
as four “mass shootings” in 2015.51  This drastic disparity stems from the 
fact that there is no singular definition of “mass shooting,” and as a result 
the numbers are calculated based on each news outlet’s individual defini-
tion of what should be considered a “mass shooting.”  Notwithstanding a 
lack of definitional consensus, tragic events such as the San Bernardino 
shooting have the public outraged, demanding stricter gun control laws 
from Congress.52  Recently, Senators Christopher Murphy, D-Conn., and 
Bill Cassidy, R-La., have introduced a bi-partisan bill entitled the Mental 
Health Reform Act of 2015 to address some of these concerns.53  During 
his presidency, President Obama issued a statement, claiming it was within 
 
 47 Rudolph, supra note 45, at 680 (“Inconsistent legal standards and reporting among states has led 
to inconsistent enforcement of federal restrictions on the sale and possession of firearms by indi-
viduals with disqualifying mental illness.”). 
 48 Id.; see also Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Response to Inquiries on the FBI’s Na-
tional Instant Criminal Background Check System (Apr. 19, 2007), http://www.fbi.gov/news/ 
  pressrel/press-releases/response-to-inquiries-on-the-fbis-national-instant-criminal-background-
check-system (stating limited reporting by states, which prompted new law). 
 49 Rudolph, supra note 45, at 681. 
 50 See Christopher Ingraham, There Have Been 334 Days and 351 Mass Shootings so Far This 
Year, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/11/ 
  30/there-have-been-334-days-and-351-mass-shootings-so-far-this-year/ (claiming there were 351 
mass shootings in the United States since the start of the year up until November 2015). 
 51 See Mark Follman, How Many Mass Shootings Are There, Really?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/04/opinion/how-many-mass-shootings-are-there-
really.html?_r=0 (“By our measure, there have been four ‘mass shootings’ this year, including 
the one in San Bernardino, and at least 73 such attacks since 1982.”). 
 52 See, e.g., WMAR Staff, Nearly 100 People Gather in Annapolis in Support of Stricter Gun Laws, 
ABC2 NEWS (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.abc2news.com/news/region/anne-arundel-
county/nearly-100-gather-in-annapolis-in-support-of-stricter-gun-laws; Joe Otterson, Nearly 200 
Music Industry Artists, Executives Demand Stricter Gun Control Laws, THE WRAP (June 23, 
2016, 7:11 AM), http://www.thewrap.com/gun-control-laws-congress-200-music-industry-
artists-billboard-lady-gaga-paul-mccartney-line-manuel-miranda-hamilton/. 
 53 S. 1945, 114th Cong. (2015). 
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his executive authority to start implementing stricter laws.54  During his last 
days in office, President Obama and his administration attempted to make 
those changes to the Improvement Act again.55  These changes required 
federal agencies to: 
[I]dentify, on a prospective basis, individuals who receive Disability Insurance 
benefits under title II of the Social Security Act (Act) or Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) payments under title XVI of the Act and who also meet certain 
other criteria, including an award of benefits based on a finding that the indi-
vidual’s mental impairment meets or medically equals the requirements of sec-
tion 12.00 of the Listing of Impairments (Listings) [to the Attorney General for 
inclusion in NICS].56   
The rule was opposed not only by the NRA,57 but also by President 
Trump.58  Most recently, the House has voted to overturn the legislation.59  
While the federal government continues to debate this issue, the states have 
initiated efforts to amend their laws in response to public outcry for stricter 
legislation. 
C.  State Legislation 
While federal law supplies certain aspects of gun control, the states also 
have the power to establish their own gun control laws.  Many states in re-
cent years have taken this opportunity to adopt stricter measures in this ar-
ea, making it more difficult for persons with signs, or a history of mental 
illness to obtain a firearm.  “According to the Law Center to Prevent Gun 
Violence, over ninety-nine new state laws strengthening gun regulation 
have been passed within the past two years.”60  In general, state laws re-
garding mentally ill persons and firearm possession can be divided into two 
categories: (1) restrict access to people who have been involuntarily com-
 
 54 See President Obama’s 2015 Executive Actions on Gun Control, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/summary-
president-obama-gun-proposals.aspx (discussing President Obama’s new plan for gun control 
legislation in America). 
 55 Implementation of the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, 81 Fed. Reg. 91702 (Dec. 
19, 2016) (to be codified as 20 C.F.R. § 421). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Tim Devaney, House Votes to Overturn Obama Gun Rule, THE HILL (Feb. 2, 2017, 4:09 PM), 
http://thehill.com/regulation/317634-house-republicans-block-obama-era-gun-rule (quoting Chris 
Cox of the NRA: “The Obama administration’s last minute, back-door gun grab would have 
stripped law-abiding Americans of their Second Amendment rights without due process.”). 
 58 Ben Marquis, Trump Releases His Plan for 2nd Amendment. . .  Leaves Millions Furious, 
CONSERVATIVE TRIBUNE (Nov. 9, 2016, 3:44 PM), http://conservativetribune.com/trump-plan-
2nd-amendment/. 
 59 Devaney, supra note 57 (“The House voted 235-180 to roll back a rule that required the Social 
Security Administration to report people who receive disability benefits and have a mental health 
condition to the FBI’s background check system.”). 
 60 Rudolph, supra note 45, at 682. 
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mitted or adjudicated mentally defective (which is similar to the federal 
statute); and (2) more restrictive approaches—including both behavioral 
and categorical restrictions on people with mental illness.61 
Despite these recent changes in a number of states, some states still 
have no statute on point to address this particular issue, and others still 
adopt laws that follow the federal standards.62  As previously discussed, 
federal law bans firearm possession by anyone who is “adjudicated as a 
mental defective or has been committed to any mental institution.”63  Of the 
remaining states, scholars have noted two distinct approaches that have 
been adopted: (1) categorically-based restrictions and (2) behaviorally-
based restrictions.64 
1.  Categorical Approaches 
The federal government and the state are currently struggling to find the 
balance between public safety and infringement on personal rights.  In re-
sponse to public demand, many states have adopted a categorical approach 
to firearm possession and the mentally ill.  These laws categorically restrict 
firearm possession and purchase rights for persons with mental illness.65  
While states vary in details of their categorical approaches, generally these 
provisions place a burden on mental health professionals to identify and 
predict patients likely to engage in violent behavior, and then report those 
patients to authorities.66 
The categorical approach is often justified in the political realm because 
concern for public safety outweighs certain individual liberties, and these 
states would rather risk subjecting one individual to constitutional depriva-
tion than putting the greater public at risk.  Proponents of this approach 
tend to “rely[] on a presumed correlation between violence risk and mem-
 
 61 Fredrick E. Vars, Symptom-Based Gun Control, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1633, 1636–37 (2014). 
 62 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-103 (2005); see also Rudolph, supra note 45, at 682–83 (dis-
cussing different state laws and state approaches). 
 63 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) (2012). 
 64 See Vars, supra note 61, at 1636–37 (acknowledging the two regimes for restrictive approaches 
towards the mentally ill and firearms restrictions). 
 65 See Rudolph, supra note 45, at 683 (defining what a “categorical” approach towards this issue 
entails). 
 66 Id. at 683–84 (“For example, the New York Secure Ammunition and Firearms Enforcement Act 
(‘NYSAFE’) requires mental health professionals to report to local law enforcement agencies all 
patients deemed likely to harm themselves or others.  The reported individuals and their relevant 
health information are submitted to state databases that prohibit reported persons’ access to fire-
arms indefinitely.  Tennessee law closely resembles the NYSAFE Act, requiring mental health 
practitioners to immediately inform law enforcement of a patient’s identifiable threats.  Reported 
patients are also entered into state and federal databases used to monitor gun purchases or pos-
session.”). 
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bership in a category of persons with a mental health adjudication.”67  
Some state legislators suggest that this measure is actually the least harmful 
or burdensome to gun rights as it creates stricter laws without changing 
general gun laws as they apply to most people.68 
However, these categorical exclusions are susceptible to much criti-
cism.  They typically rest on mental illness diagnoses, which are all too of-
ten not reliable or valid, as will be discussed more infra.  Second, key as-
sumptions underlying such laws are not supported by adequate studies or 
sufficient data.69  Third, because mental health professionals sustain the 
burden of reporting these patients to law enforcement, many argue that this 
will (1) breach patient/client trust and/or confidentiality and thus (2) chill 
mentally ill patients from effectively seeking help.  These consequences 
will be explored more deeply in Part II.D. 
2.  Behavioral Models 
The second type of model states use when addressing this issue is a be-
havioral approach, or a symptom-based firearm restriction.  These laws are 
based on the behavior of an individual, searching for violent tendencies or 
certain symptoms allegedly indicating violent tendencies, rather than focus-
ing on a categorical diagnosis.70  There are multiple potential advantages to 
adopting the behavioral approach to firearm possession.  To start, laws that 
 
 67 Id. at 684. 
 68 See, e.g., id. (showing that in Tennessee, legislators propose isolating mental illness as an effec-
tive way of reducing gun violence and addressing the public concern). 
 69 See Jonathan M. Metzl & Kenneth T. MacLeish, Mental Illness, Mass Shootings, and the Politics 
of American Firearms, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 240, 241–42 (2015) (noting that overall, less 
than 5% of homicides between 2001–2010 were committed by people with diagnoses of a mental 
illness) (emphasis added); see also Katherine L. Record & Lawrence O. Gostin, A Robust Indi-
vidual Right to Bear Arms Versus the Public’s Health: The Court’s Reliance on Firearm Re-
strictions on the Mentally Ill, 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 371, 377 (2012) (“Research is exceptional-
ly limited but suggests that any increased risk in violence is extremely modest, if at all.”).  In 
fact, studies continuously show that patients with mental disorders are not more violent, unless 
they are using drugs, in which case their propensity for violence increases significantly.  See E. 
Marie Rueve & Randon S. Welton, Violence and Mental Illness, 5.5 PSYCHIATRY 34, 39 (2008) 
(discussing one study that “discovered that the combination of alcoholism and antisocial person-
ality disorder increased the odds of women committing homicide 40 to 50 fold, while the diagno-
sis of schizophrenia increased the risk only 5 to 6 fold.”  And another study “determined that pa-
tients with concomitant mental illness and substance abuse were 73 percent more likely to be 
aggressive than were nonsubstance abusers, with or without mental illness.  Further, patients with 
primary diagnoses of substance use disorders and personality disorders were 240 percent more 
likely to commit violent acts than mentally ill patients without substance abuse issues.”). 
 70 See Rudolph, supra note 45, at 685–86 (“For example, in Indiana, law enforcement officers may 
seize weapons from all persons exhibiting potentially harmful behavior, irrespective of whether 
that individual is mentally ill or impaired.  Connecticut follows a similar model, allowing law en-
forcement authorities to remove guns from individuals that present an immediate risk of injurious 
behavior.”) 
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focus on behavior more closely mirror other mental health laws.71  The be-
havioral approach acknowledges the important notion that a diagnosis of 
mental illness does not necessarily equate to a propensity for violence.72  
While, as noted, the categorical provisions have been criticized as discrim-
inatory and overinclusive, the behavioral approaches seek to avoid those 
defects by relying on the actual symptoms and actions of individuals, 
which is a better predictor than mere diagnosis.73 
Ironically, one main argument against a behavioral approach is that it 
“[casts] too wide a net” upon individual gun rights.74  Supporters of indi-
vidual gun liberties often prefer laws that restrict only a small subset of the 
population’s rights (i.e. a categorical approach requiring a mentally ill di-
agnosis) as opposed to a law that could consequently subject even a greater 
number of people to stricter controls and restricted liberties.  Public opinion 
polling shows wide support for the assumption that the issue with gun con-
trol in this country is who is accessing guns and problems with the mental 
health care system, rather than inadequate gun control laws generally.75  
Whether past behavior is a reliable indicator of future violence is also an 
issue hotly debated.  Just as mental illness is hard to define and diagnose, 
propensity for violence is arguably as equally vague a concept.  Does a per-
son who frequently plays violent video games qualify or must they act on 
those interests?  Would angry words be sufficient to qualify as dangerous 
behavior? 
Another weakness that arises under a behavioral approach is consider-
ing who would be responsible for noticing, determining, and reporting 
alarm-raising behaviors.  Placing the responsibility on the shoulders of 
mental health professionals could raise similar concerns generated by the 
categorical approaches, including breach of confidentiality, or could create 
 
 71 A person cannot be convicted of a crime simply because they have a mental illness.  There needs 
to be some behavior or action that justifies the law’s intervention.  It follows that having laws 
that restrict rights of individuals based solely on a diagnosis do not comport with the mental 
health law system.  See generally Morse, supra note 11 (discussing the range of mental health 
laws). 
 72 See Paul S. Appelbaum, Violence and Mental Disorders: Data and Public Policy, 163 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1319, 1319 (2006) (explaining data that suggests mental illness alone is not indicia 
of violent tendencies); but see Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., A National Study of Violent Behavior in 
Persons With Schizophrenia, 63 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 490, 496 (2006) (suggesting people 
with schizophrenia are likely to be more violent than the “average” individual); see also supra 
note 69 (discussing increase in violence risk when mental illness is paired with substance abuse). 
 73 Rudolph, supra note 45, at 684–85 (describing that mental health professionals claim such re-
quirements cause over-identification, and have a negative effect on those looking for help). 
 74 Id. at 687. 
 75 See Craighill & Clement, supra note 3 (revealing studies that suggest people are more concerned 
with the mental health system rather than gun laws generally); see also David Kyle Johnson, 
Guns Don’t Kill People, People Do?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Feb. 12, 2013) (highlighting that the 
slogan for the NRA is “guns don’t kill people, people kill people”). 
744 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 19:3 
 
a negative stigma which could lead to persons being dissuaded from seek-
ing medical treatment and/or counseling.  If family members were respon-
sible for reporting behavior, results may be biased, as certain family mem-
bers will undoubtedly act to “protect” their loved ones and may not report 
behavior.  These questions create doubts that a behavioral approach would 
do a substantially better job at protecting the masses than a categorical ap-
proach.76 
One recent study found that concerns about a perpetrator’s mental sta-
bility were reported prior to the crime in 11% of shootings between January 
2009 and July 2015.77  Many of these reports were based on exhibitions of 
violent tendencies in behavior.78  With a clear definition of what behavior 
is sufficient to qualify as violent, as well as efficient procedures and meth-
ods of reporting, many of the weaknesses of a behavioral approach could 
be alleviated and decrease the percentage of these instances in a way that 
does not violate constitutional rights. 
II.  UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF MOST RESTRICTIVE MEASURES 
New state laws that categorically exclude anyone with a mental illness 
from possessing a firearm likely violate the Second Amendment, and per-
haps the Equal Protection Clause as well.  Furthermore, the increasing 
pressure being placed on mental health professionals to, in essence, predict 
future violence is unfair and unworkable given that cognitive psychology 
and the related field of neuroprediction are immature sciences, and are not 
yet able to predict relevant behavior with the accuracy that the American 
legal system should demand.79 
A.  Different Restrictive Approaches 
States have adopted a number of variations of the restrictive, categorical 
approach to this issue regarding the mentally ill and firearm possession.  
Some states prohibit possession or ownership by those who have had any 
type of commitment, whether voluntary or involuntary (as opposed to fed-
 
 76 This concept and proposal will be discussed further in the Conclusion. 
 77 Analysis of Recent Mass Shootings, EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY (2015), 
http://everytownresearch.org/documents/2015/09/analysis-mass-shootings.pdf/?version=meter+ 
  at+1&module=meter-Links&pgtype=article&contentId=&mediaId=&referrer=https%3A%2F% 
(“[M]ental health of the shooter had been brought to the attention of a medical practitioner, 
school official, or legal authority prior to the shooting.”). 
 78 Id. at 3; see also Editorial, Don’t Blame Mental Illness for Gun Violence, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/16/opinion/dont-blame-mental-illness-for-gun-violence 
  .html?_r=0 (quoting the “Everytown for Gun Safety” article). 
 79 See generally Thomas Nadelhoffer et al., Neuroprediction, Violence, and the Law: Setting the 
Stage, 5.1 NEUROETHICS 67, 68 (2012). 
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eral law, which only includes involuntary commitment); the most restric-
tive regime turns on diagnosis and prohibits ownership or possession by 
people with mental illness even without history of commitment or without 
a regard to symptoms others prohibit ownership or possession by people 
with mental illness but without history of commitment.80  For example, 
some states prohibit gun possession by anyone who “[i]s or has been diag-
nosed as having a significant behavioral, emotional, or mental disor-
der[] . . . .”81  Such a categorical exclusion is both overinclusive and under-
inclusive.  It is overinclusive, or too broad, because if a policy like this was 
enforced, it would “disqualify roughly 17% to 20% of the overall popula-
tion based on diagnosis of severity.”82  It is underinclusive, or too narrow, 
because relying on diagnoses will exclude people in the population who do 
not seek medical help.83 
B.  Diagnosing Mental Illness—A Clinical Approach 
When dealing with constitutional rights, determining mental illness 
should be a legal decision—not a medical or psychological decision.84  
However, courts give great deference to the mental health profession to 
help define those boundaries.85  A concern with state laws that ban anyone 
diagnosed with a mental illness, thus, is that the legal test imports the unre-
liability and variability of mental diagnoses.  Studies suggest that mental 
health professionals’ diagnoses of mental disorders are, at best, widely var-
ied.86  Often in field studies, such variations do not seem too drastic.  How-
ever, compared to medicine generally, and in actual practice, diagnosis in 
the mental health arena is not as strong.87  Because of this lack of reliability 
 
 80 Vars & Young, supra note 12, at 11–12 (discussing the federal law and the differences between 
the federal law and various different state laws); e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1448(a)(2) 
(2017); D.C. CODE § 7-2502.03(a)(6) (2016); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-129(b)(2)(J) (LexisNexis 
2016); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-3.1(a)(4) (2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, 
§ 131(d)(ii) (West 2015). 
 81 Id.; see e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-7(c)(3) (West 2017). 
 82 Vars, supra note 61, at 1637 n.21 (citing Ronald C. Kessler et al., Prevalence and Treatment of 
Mental Disorders, 1990 to 2003, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2515, 2518 (2005)). 
 83 Id. at 1639 (explaining that under this regime, too many people end up interacting with law en-
forcement before ever receiving a diagnosis). 
 84 Morse, supra note 11, at 211. 
 85 See, e.g., Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 172 (2003) (discussing and defining mental health 
professionals’ roles and boundaries in the courtroom and case); but see Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 
U.S. 71, 109 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“We have recognized repeatedly the ‘uncertainty of 
diagnosis in this field and the tentativeness of professional judgment.’”). 
 86 See, e.g., Charles W. Lidz et al., The Accuracy of Predictions of Violence to Others, 269 JAMA 
1007, 1009 (1993) (showing that prediction rates and accuracy are very low while using DSM 
and other diagnostic criteria in the psychology profession). 
 87 See generally Ahmed Aboraya et al., The Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnosis Revisited: The Cli-
nician’s Guide to Improve the Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnosis, 3.1 PSYCHIATRY 41, 44 
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in diagnosis, mental health laws often focus more on behavior, rather than 
classification to a certain category or particular illness.88 
Some courts have been very skeptical of mental health experts’ testi-
mony that relies simply on diagnosis; whatever the expert did to reach 
his/her opinion—use of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (“DSM”), clinical evaluations, interviews with family, etc.—
must be clearly explained to the court.89  If the court is not satisfied with 
such explanations, whether due to lack of reliability or validity, testimony 
can be barred from the courtroom. 
Most of these restrictive state statutes require that the mental illness be 
“significant” and often leave the distinction of severity to mental health 
professionals.90  A serious mental disorder, insanity, or “marked subnormal 
intelligence” are usually prerequisites.91  In other instances, states will sug-
gest certain illnesses established in the DSM-V—the mental health profes-
sionals’ guide in terms of diagnosing patients—are enough to qualify 
someone for these restrictions.92  The DSM is the handbook used by health 
care professionals in the United States and much of the world, and is the 
authoritative guide to the diagnosis of mental disorders.93  Now in its fifth 
edition, the manual has evolved over the years, refining, adding and shed-
ding diagnoses, by which psychiatrists and psychologists can classify their 
patients in order to establish treatment plans.94  While generally recognized 
as the “[B]ible” of its field,95 there are many problems that arise with use of 
 
(2006) (discussing unreliability in psychiatric diagnosis: “The three main reasons for diagnostic 
disagreement were: inconstancy of the patient (5%), inconstancy of the clinician (32.5%), and in-
adequacy of the nomenclature (62.5%)”). 
 88 Mental health laws usually do not require a categorical diagnosis of a particular disorder, like 
schizophrenia or bipolar disorder, in order to apply to individuals.  For example, if a person is 
suffering from a mental illness or disorder, that person is not automatically mentally incompetent 
under the law.  Furthermore, a person can be found mentally incompetent without a categorical 
diagnosis.  See generally Raphael Leo, Competency and the Capacity to Make Treatment Deci-
sions: A Primer for Primary Care Physicians, 1 PRIMARY CARE COMPANION J. CLINICAL 
PSYCHIATRY, 131, 131–41 (1999) (discussing competency and mental capacity).   
 89 See generally Marc Sageman, Challenging the Admissibility of Mental Expert Testimony, 
PRACTICAL LITIGATOR, Jan. 2002, at 7. 
 90 HAW REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-7(c)(3) (West 2017); Vars, supra note 61, at 1637. 
 91 Vars, supra note 61, at 1636; Jana R. McCreary, “Mentally Defective” Language in the Gun 
Control Act, 45 CONN. L. REV. 813, 843–52 (2013) (discussing judicial interpretations of laws 
that require mental illness diagnosis). 
 92 See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-7(c)(3) (West 2017) (“Is or has been diagnosed as having a 
significant behavioral, emotional, or mental disorders as defined by the most current diagnostic 
manual of the American Psychiatric Association or for treatment for organic brain syndromes”). 
 93 THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (Am. Psychiatric Ass’n 
5th ed.) (2013). 
 94 Id. 
 95 Ferris Jabr, The Newest Edition of Psychiatry’s “Bible,” the DSM-5, is Complete, SCI. AM. (Jan. 
28, 2013), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/dsm-5-update/. 
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the DSM that can inform issues with diagnosis-based gun laws.  To begin, 
many critics argue there is a lack of reliability with experts using DSM di-
agnostic criteria because it is too vague or broad.96  Criteria from the DSM 
also do not provide enough guidance for the level of precision, let alone ac-
curacy, that should be required in the legal system.97  Second, the DSM-V 
is not a legal device—it was not created, nor is it encouraged, for use in the 
legal context.98  As explained by Stephen Morse: 
All [DSM] diagnostic categories include necessary behavioral criteria, and for 
most, including schizophrenia and affective disorders, behavioral criteria alone 
are sufficient to justify the diagnosis.  The question is whether a diagnosis pro-
duces value added beyond the information conveyed by the behavioral criteria 
that define the diagnostic category.  The legal issue in mental health law cases 
is never whether the agent suffers from a disease; rather, it is always whether 
the agent has a crazy reason for legally relevant conduct.99 
These laws specifically relating to diagnosis are employed because of 
the common perception that diagnosis of a mental illness leads to an in-
creased risk of violence.  However, while it may be true that certain disor-
ders suggest people are more prone to violence or are often displayed as 
such,100 many people who suffer from mental disorder are not dangerous.  
In fact, studies have suggested that people who have mental disorders are 
more likely to be the victims of violent acts, rather than the perpetrators.101  
 
 96 Reliability refers to the extent in which psychiatric assessments of a patient are consistent—or, 
more simply, the number of therapists who agree on a diagnosis for a patient.  Saul McLeod, 
What is Reliability, SIMPLY PSYCHOLOGY (2013), http://www.simplypsychology.org/ 
  reliability.html; see also Jeffrey R. Lacasse, After DSM-5: A Critical Mental Health Research 
Agenda for the 21st Century, 24.1 RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 5, 7 (2014). 
 97 See Ralph Slovenko, The DSM in Litigation and Legislation, 39.1 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 
6, 6 (2011), http://www.jaapl.org/content/39/1/6.full (“The caveat in the American Psychiatric 
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revi-
sion (DSM-IV-TR), advises that it is intended for use in clinical, educational, and research find-
ings, not for forensic purposes.  It warns that when the Manual is used for forensic purposes, 
there are significant risks that the information will be misused or misunderstood.  These dangers 
arise, it states, because of the imperfect fit between the questions of ultimate concern to the law 
and the information contained in a clinical diagnosis.”). 
 98 Id.; see also Cautionary Statement for Forensic Use of DSM-5, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2017), http://dsm.psychiatryonline.org/doi/full/10.1176/appi.books.
9780890425596.CautionaryStatement. 
 99 Morse, supra note 11, at 219; see also THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS (Am. Psychiatric Ass’n 5th ed.) (2013). 
100 See Mental Health Reporting: Facts About Mental Illness and Violence, UNIV. OF WASH. SCH. 
OF SOC. WORK, http://depts.washington.edu/mhreport/facts_violence.php (last visited Jan. 10, 
2017) (“Characters in prime time television portrayed as having a mental illness are depicted as 
the most dangerous of all demographic groups: 60 percent were shown to be involved in crime or 
violence.”). 
101 Id. (“People with psychiatric disabilities are far more likely to be victims than perpetrators of 
violent crime.  People with severe mental illnesses, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder or psychosis, 
are 2.5 times more likely to be attacked, raped or mugged than the general population.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
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Furthermore, data shows there are more accurate indicators of violence 
than diagnosis, including substance abuse.102 
Laws that require diagnosis-based restrictions also face a fundamental 
shortcoming: a large number of people with mental illness are not diag-
nosed, or are diagnosed incorrectly.  Recent studies suggest that potentially 
half of the people with mental illness go undiagnosed and untreated.103  
This suggests that a law which focuses on diagnosis will also be seriously 
underinclusive, as it will fail to identify potentially dangerous individuals 
who do have a mental illness. 
In modern mental health law, the fact that a person suffers from a men-
tal illness will not suffice to prove he or she is guilty of a crime, or liable 
for some conduct.104  The symptoms or propensity allegedly associated 
with the defect is not alone enough.  The law in other contexts requires 
more than a labeled diagnosis.  What traditionally has been important is the 
legally relevant behavior that accompanies the diagnosis.  Statutes that ex-
clude anyone with a mental illness make this leap in the reverse direction, 
assuming conduct will follow from the diagnosis, rather than focusing on 
the actual behavior.105  Categorical laws are making that same inaccurate, 
albeit reverse, inference at the expense of individual liberties and freedom. 
C.  Propensity for Violence—Why Clinical, Actuarial, and Neurological 
Prediction Methods All Fall Short 
Obtaining a mental health diagnosis does not equate to a propensity for 
violence.  First, there are many studies that suggest that no such correlation 
exists between a mental disorder and future violence.106  There is also little 
 
102 Studies have shown that substance abuse is a better indicator of violence than mental illness.  As 
of late, addiction is not recognized as a disorder that would qualify as a “mental illness,” but 
people with substance abuse issues are more likely to commit violent acts.  Studies have also 
shown that level of violence decreases after substance abuse ceases.  “This suggests that target-
ing attributes other than, or in addition to, diagnosis could more efficiently reduce violence.”  
Vars, supra note 61, at 1639; see also Kate Pickert & John Cloud, If You Think Someone is Men-
tally Ill: Loughner’s Six Warning Signs, TIME (Jan. 11, 2011), http://content.time.com/time/ 
  printout/0,8816,2041733,00.html (discussing other warning signs for mental illness). 
103 See, e.g., Joel L. Young, Untreated Mental Illness, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Dec. 30, 2015), 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/when-your-adult-child-breaks-your-
heart/201512/untreated-mental-illness/. 
104 Morse, supra note 11, at 219 (clarifying that mental health law cases are concerned with the 
“crazy reason” for legally relevant conduct, rather than whether or not the agent suffers from a 
disease). 
105 See id. at 219–22 (discussing why mental health laws should focus on behavior as opposed to 
relying on medical diagnosis, due to the lack of heterogeneity in a diagnosis). 
106 See, e.g., Seena Fazel et al., Schizophrenia and Violence: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 
6 PLOS MED. 1, at 7–8, 12 (Aug. 2009) (concluding that increased risk of violence was associat-
ed with drug and alcohol problems, regardless of whether the person had schizophrenia). 
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reliable evidence to suggest that mental health professionals can accurately 
predict an individual’s propensity for gun violence without additional 
methods beyond their traditional approaches: 
[P]sychiatrists, using clinical judgment, cannot accurately foresee which pa-
tients will be violent. . . .  [But] clinicians may improve their predictions of vio-
lent behavior if they routinely use structured risk assessment methods that iden-
tify indicators of violence such as a history of violent activity or substance 
abuse.  Such guidance is absent from current state legislation.107 
Scholars and various mental health experts have stated that those mentally 
ill persons who may pose a risk are also difficult to identify because of the 
broad spectrum of disorders, which make identifying the line between fu-
ture dangerousness and potential harmlessness even more difficult to dis-
tinguish.108 
Lastly, for reasons previously discussed, mental health professionals are 
not always accurate when diagnosing patients, and are similarly limited in 
their ability to “see the future” and predict future dangerousness.  However, 
critics argue that there are many areas of the law which rely on the idea of 
predicting future dangerousness, and there are no sound prediction methods 
in those instances either.109 
1.  Actuarial Risk Prediction 
Because clinical diagnosis is an imperfect science in terms of predicting 
future violence, alternative prediction methods have developed in an at-
tempt to better predict violence, with the most common method being actu-
arial violence risk assessment.110  These actuarial methods could potentially 
be used in future gun legislation, as the main concern rests in predicting fu-
ture violence risks from those with mental illnesses.  While many different 
actuarial models have developed over the years, one of the most promising 
methods is the Classification of Violence Risk (“COVR”), developed as 
 
107 Rudolph, supra note 45, at 694–95. 
108 Jeffrey W. Swanson, Preventing the Unpredicted: Managing Violence Risk in Mental Health 
Care, 59 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 191, 192–93 (2008) (discussing the differences between predic-
tion and prevention and the difficulty mental health professionals have when diagnosing patients 
and predicting future violence). 
109 In sentencing cases, many of the decisions often turn on prediction of future violence or likeli-
hood to recidivate.  There are no actuarial or neuropsychological methods that can predict recidi-
vism rates with perfect accuracy in those instances either, but they are still permissible and often 
encouraged in courts.  See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899–901 (1983) (admitting 
expert clinical opinions involving hypothetical questions regarding the defendant’s future dan-
gerousness and the likelihood that he would present a continuing threat to society). 
110 See Nadelhoffer et al., supra note 79, at 75–80 (discussing the role of actuarial methods in vio-
lence predictions). 
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part of the MacArthur Study of Mental Disorder and Violence.111  The 
study assessed 134 potential risk factors for future violent behavior based 
on male and female patients.112  The study design consisted of patients re-
cently released from a civil psychiatric hospital.  The patients were fol-
lowed and monitored for twenty weeks,113 and researchers examined hospi-
tal records, patient self-reports, and the reports of friends and family 
members in order to assess the risk of violence.114  The MacArthur Study 
utilized a “classification tree” methodology to evaluate risk assessment: 
This approach allows many different combinations of risk factors to classify a 
person as high or low risk.  Based on a sequence established by the classifica-
tion tree, a first question is asked of all persons being assessed.  Contingent on 
the answer to that question, one or another second question is posed, and so on, 
until each person is classified by the tree into a final “risk class.”115 
Risk factors include the person’s race, gender, prior crime and violence, 
and victimization.116 
While the COVR delivered impressive results, it was validated “only on 
samples of psychiatric inpatients in acute facilities in the United States who 
would soon be discharged into the community.  Whether the validity of the 
model can be generalized to other people . . . remains to be determined em-
pirically.”117  Because of this, many critics argue that the COVR may not 
yet be suitable for contexts outside of civil commitment hearings.118  De-
spite lack of data validating the approach in a criminal context, applying 
actuarial prediction methods like the COVR, in the context of gun control 
legislation, would serve as a better and more accurate approach than solely 
relying on clinical diagnostic decisions.  Utilizing such a “classification 
tree” or looking at multiple factors would serve as a better indicator for vio-
lence, be more accurate, and pose less infringement on constitutional rights 
than existing categorical restriction methods. 
 
111 See generally JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE MACARTHUR 
STUDY OF MENTAL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE (2001).  Other well documented, but arguably less 
promising, methods include the VRAG and HCR-20.  See M. Dolan & M. Doyle, Violence Risk 
Prediction: Clinical and Actuarial Measures and the Role of the Psycopathy Checklist, 177 BRIT. 
J. PSYCHIATRY 303, 305 (2000), http://bjp.rcpsych.org/content/bjprcpsych/177/4/303.full.pdf. 
112 Nadelhoffer et al., supra note 79, at 77. 
113 Id.; see also John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among 
Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 411–12 (2006). 
114 Monahan, supra note 113, at 412. 
115 Id. (“This contrasts with the usual approach to actuarial risk assessment, such as the HCR-20 and 
the VRAG, in which a common set of questions is asked of everyone being assessed and every 
answer is weighted and summed to produce a score that can be used for purposes of categoriza-
tion.”). 
116 Id. at 413–27. 
117 Nadelhoffer et al., supra note 79, at 78. 
118 Id. 
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2.  Neuroprediction 
Currently, neuroscientists are attempting to find a method to predict 
whether an individual possesses a significant threat of violence with better 
accuracy and precision.  This new science, in theory, could help create bet-
ter gun control laws because if neuroscience could identify significant 
threats of violence, laws that are not underinclusive or overinclusive could 
be created.  Over the past two decades, progress has been made in “identi-
fying and exploring some of the neural correlates of violence and aggres-
sion.”119  Specifically, a great portion of the research has been focused pri-
marily on identifying neural correlates to predict future recidivism rates of 
past criminals.120  However, such studies can be applied to the issue of re-
stricting the rights of mentally ill persons to possess firearms because poli-
cy makers are concerned with the same factor—risk of violence.  Risk as-
sessments—actuarial or personality tests like the psychopathy checklist,121 
and other measures discussed above—and neuropsychological measures 
have demonstrated the ability to predict future antisocial behavior.122  
“However, these latter measures serve only as proxies for direct measure-
ment of the brain’s inhibitory and cognitive control systems.”123  Recent 
developments in neuroscience suggest neural correlates could be used in 
the future to classify or identify character traits or abnormalities that could 
directly impact risk of violence.124  Neuroscientists have been able to iden-
tify certain brain regions associated with impulse control—an important is-
sue in gun violence—including the anterior cingulate cortex (“ACC”) (a 
limbic region associated with error processing, conflict monitoring, re-
sponse selection, and avoidance learning),125 basal ganglia, dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex,126 and the amygdala.127  Different approaches, including 
exploring ACC activity, studying the monoamine oxidas A gene (“MAOA” 
or the “warrior gene”), and utilizing structural and functional brain imaging 
scans, have been utilized by scientists and researchers attempting to find 
 
119 Id. at 80. 
120 See, e.g., id. at 80–82 (discussing the neural correlates of psychopathy); Eyal Aharoni et al., Neu-
roprediction of Future Rearrest, 110 PNAS 6223, 6223 (2013), www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/ 
  pnas.1219302110. 
121 Hare Psychopathy Checklist, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MENTAL DISORDERS, 
http://www.minddisorders.com/Flu-Inv/Hare-Psychopathy-Checklist.html (last visited Jan. 10, 
2017) (“The Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) is a diagnostic tool used to rate a per-
son’s psychopathic or antisocial tendencies.”). 





127 Id. at 6227 n.14. 
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the link that could lead to the potential identification of the legally signifi-
cant risk of allegedly dangerous individuals. 
One recent study explored ACC activity and a go/no-go impulse control 
task to asses and predict future antisocial behavior in a study of released 
criminal offenders.128  Lesion studies in both animals and humans have 
shown damage to the ACC can lead to difficulties in regulating behavior 
changes such as apathy and aggressiveness.129  Furthermore, studies sug-
gest that the ACC plays an important role in the process of cognitive con-
trol—something perhaps of great importance when talking about gun con-
trol issues.130  The results revealed: 
Th[e] pattern of results raises the possibility that brain activity in regions such 
as the ACC, elicited by a simple experimental task, may lend incremental utili-
ty to existing behavioral risk factors in the ability to predict rearrest.  In addi-
tion, these results support existing theories that paralimbic function subserves 
the relationship between cognitive control and antisocial behavior and that the 
ACC in particular may facilitate inhibitory learning by feeding error-related in-
formation to inhibitory control centers.  Moreover, this pattern supports the 
view that neurocognitive endophenotypes carry the potential to characterize 
underlying traits and defects independently of behavioral phenotypes, such as 
self-report instruments and expert-rater diagnoses based on client interviews 
and collateral historical information.  Finally, this work highlights potential 
neuronal systems that could be targeted for treatment intervention.  One plausi-
ble hypothesis is that interventions that modulate ACC activity may help to in-
crease cognitive control systems and thereby reduce future recidivism.131 
While the study provided a valuable insight into the ACC and impul-
sivity, and inspired some hope that neurological components could become 
an accurate measure of future violence, more research—specifically more 
research from an out-sample population—would need to be done before 
applying such findings in a legal setting.  In fact, Russ Poldrack’s reanaly-
sis of the data showed that the incremental payoff was minimal.132  
Poldrack took issue with the fact that the study did not examine out-of-
sample predictive accuracy,133 therefore suggesting the data was too weak 
and incapable of being replicated by subsequent studies.  As is a problem in 
many neurological studies claiming to find neural correlates relating to 
prediction of human behavior, according to Poldrack, the “statistical rela-
 
128 Id. at 6223. 
129 Id.  Indeed, ACC-damaged patients have been classed in the “acquired psychopathic personality” 
genre, which will be discussed more below.  Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 6224. 
132 Russ Poldrack, How Well Can We Predict Future Criminal Acts From fMRI Data?, 
RUSSPOLDRACK.ORG (Apr. 6, 2013, 4:25  PM), http://www.russpoldrack.org/2013/04/how-well-
can-we-predict-future-criminal.html (reanalyzing the Aharoni study in light of out-of-sample da-
ta). 
133 Id. 
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tionships within a sample generally provide an overly optimistic estimate 
of the ability to generalize to new samples.  In order to be able to claim that 
one can ‘predict’ in a real-world sense, one has to validate the predictive 
accuracy of the technique on out-of-sample data.”134  Poldrack then reana-
lyzed the data using cross-data analysis and determined there was only a 
“slight benefit to out-of-sample prediction of future rearrests using dACC 
activation, particularly in the period from 20 to 48 months after release.”135  
Combining both analyses suggest that fMRI data can provide relevant in-
formation as to whether an individual will be rearrested, or reveal a tenden-
cy for high risk impulsive behavior, but the predictability is rather small.136  
Because of this small predictability rate, it is unclear how such a method 
would accurately translate into prediction of future violence in terms of gun 
control legislation.  With such an incremental payoff, it is unlikely fMRI 
data in this context would prove helpful or viable when dealing with Se-
cond Amendment issues. 
Another neuroscientific approach to determine future violence has ex-
amined specific genes or alleles to determine if they have any effect or in-
fluence on risks of violence.  For example, studies have examined the 
MAOA gene, commonly known as the “warrior gene,” using a “neural in-
termediate phenotype strategy” to explore potential violence correlations.137  
Both animal and human studies point to MAOA’s role in impulsive aggres-
sive behavior.138  While research has shown no direct correlation between 
the MAOA-L allele and an increased risk for violent behavior, one study 
suggests that it nevertheless “predisposes males who experience early life 
adversity or abuse to reactive violence and aggression.”139  Using function-
al and structural imaging techniques, researchers have been able to research 
MAOA’s effect on cognitive tasks.140 
Current research thus suggests that when the MAOA allele is combined 





137 Nadelhoffer et al., supra note 79, at 82–83 (examining the prominence, developments, and moral 
problems presented by neuroprediction in the legal context). 
138 Id. at 82.  For example, past studies have associated the MAOA gene in mice with heightened 
aggressive outbursts.  Some studies in humans suggest male family members with the gene were 
subject to predisposed “short tempers, and violent sexual behavior.”  Id.; see also H.G. Brunner 
et al., Abnormal Behavior Associated with a Point Mutation in the Structural Gene for Monoam-
ine Oxidase A, 262 SCI. 578, 578–80 (1993) (connecting “complete and selective deficiency of 
enzymatic activity of monoamine oxidase A (MAOA)” with antisocial behavior). 
139 See Nadelhoffer et al., supra note 79, at 83 (describing a study that found “the association be-
tween early familial adversity and mental health [in males] was significantly stronger in the low-
activity MAOA vs. the high-activity MAOA groups”). 
140 Id. at 83. 
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violence increases in males.141  Of course, based on the current information 
known about MAOA, it is still debatable whether this potentially correlated 
relationship between MAOA and violence can be incorporated into policy 
and legal decisions concerning future violence.  However, utilizing such a 
strategy in the context of gun control legislation could also raise additional 
unique constitutional concerns and does not solve any of the issues raised 
by current legislation.142 
Lastly, most of the research in this field has focused on individuals with 
psychopathy—a disorder that results in antisocial behavior, including lack 
of reactive human emotions like guilt, remorse, or empathy.143  Due to the-
se factors, psychopathic people, despite making up only 1% or less of the 
population, could be responsible for as much as 30–40% of all violent 
crime.144  This significant percentage has led some scientists and scholars 
to the conclusion that neuroscientific research on psychopathy could pro-
vide better models for predicting violence, which could potentially be used 
in a legal setting.145 
When studying psychopathic individuals, neuroscientists have found 
the following functional neurocognitive deficits: 
(a) reduced amygdala and vmPFC activity during aversive conditioning tasks; 
(b) impairment in passive avoidance learning tasks and differential reward-
punishment tasks; (c) reduced amygdala activation during emotional memory; 
(d) reduced activation in the anterior and posterior cingulate gyri, left inferior 
frontal gyrus, amygdala, and ventral striatum when encoding, rehearsing, and 
recognizing negatively valenced words; and (e) reduced activation in the ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex and anterior temporal cortex when distinguishing 
between moral and non-moral images.146 
 
141 Id.; see also Joshua W. Buckholtz & Andreas Meyer-Lindenberg, MAOA and the Neurogenetic 
Architecture of Human Aggression, 31 TRENDS IN NEUROSCIENCE 120, 123 (2008) (exploring 
the relationship between MAOA-L and inhibitory control and finding differences in the limbic 
system in MAOA-L and “highly significant genotype-related differences in brain function”). 
142 Specifically, it would require determining if a person possesses the MAOA allele and/or has a 
history of factors considered to be “risk” factors in terms of promoting anti-social behavior.  Ob-
taining such information may prove to be an invasion of privacy and could lead to other legal 
troubles yet unprecedented.  It is hard to imagine a functioning system that would require every 
person applying for a gun license to be tested for the allele or gene, in addition to significant 
background/history tests. 
143 See M. Dolan & M. Doyle, Violence Risk Prediction: Clinical and Actuarial Measures and the 
Role of the Psychopathy Checklist, 177 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 303, 303 (2000) (arguing that sys-
tematic/structured risk assessment approaches may enhance accuracy of clinical prediction of vi-
olent outcomes). 
144 Nadelhoffer et al., supra note 79, at 80. 
145 Id.  “Finally, the construct of psychopathy has had a major impact on violence risk assessment.  
For instance, it is the only clinical disorder that has been shown to confer increased risk for both 
reactive and instrumental aggression.”  Id. 
146 Nadelhoffer et al., supra note 79, at 93–95 (citations omitted). 
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Each of these findings is significant based on our understanding of 
brain function today—the amygdala being associated with emotions and 
aggression,147 and the prefrontal cortex being involved in decision-making 
processes.148  However, there are still other studies that suggest such corre-
lations are not as strong as these studies purport.  “Violence risk prediction 
is an inexact science and as such will continue to provoke debate” in the 
neuroscientific community and beyond.149 
Although these new neuroimaging methods offer further potential to be 
able to predict future violence, since the technology is in its infant stages, it 
is likely not able to help the legal community or policy makers at this time, 
in the context of gun control legislation.150  Prediction methods are often 
used in the legal system in terms of bail, sentencing, parole, the death pen-
alty, and neuroscience or neuroimaging in combination with other existing 
methods, which could potentially increase prediction accuracy.  However, 
these studies would need to be proven to be reliable and repeatable in a 
large population of individuals.151  In addition, unless these studies can help 
in diagnosing psychopathic individuals, such tools would do little to solve 
the constitutional questions that arise from restrictive categorical exclu-
sions.  Additionally, there is a communication disjunction between neuro-
scientists and the law which often makes applying these studies in a legal 
context difficult: 
 
147 See Swantje Matthies et al., Small Amygdala—High Aggression? The Role of the Amygdala in 
Modulating Aggression in Healthy Subjects, 13 THE WORLD J. BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 75, 76–
80 (2012) (discussing the role of the amygdala in aggression). 
148 Philippe Domenech & Etienne Koechlin, Executive Control and Decision-Making in the Prefron-
tal Cortex, 1 CURRENT OPINION IN BEHAV. SCIS. 101, 101–05 (2015), http://ac.els-
cdn.com/S2352154614000278/1-s2.0-S2352154614000278-main.pdf?_tid=a0da7114-dfe2-11e5-
8cad-00000aab0f26&acdnat=1456860196_b3e5d506c7713e6edc46b0a1363e5fa8 (discussing the 
role of prefrontal cortex in decision making). 
149 M. Dolan & M. Doyle, Violence Risk Prediction: Clinical and Actuarial Measures and the Role 
of the Psychopathy Checklist, 177 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 303, 303 (2000). 
150 Perhaps the most likely reason that such technology would not be helpful to policy makers is that 
since the technology is in its infant stages, it would not pass the Daubert standard in court due to 
“individualization” problems.  See Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 464 (5th Cir. 2000) (“use of 
psychiatric evidence to predict a murderer’s ‘future dangerousness’ fails all 
five Daubert factors.”); but see Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1998) (suggesting a lower reliability standard should be applied for social sciences as compared 
to “hard sciences”).  The difference between these two cases is that first one dealt with the issue 
of guilt, while the latter dealt with issues of sentencing.  Such a disparity suggests the guilt phase 
and sentencing phase of trial treat evidence that fails Daubert standards quite differently.  How-
ever, what is at issue in this Comment is predicting future violence to limit a person’s access to 
firearms.  It is unclear whether the courts would be persuaded to allow this scientific evidence to 
uphold these restrictions, because gun possession prior to a violent act does not fit squarely under 
either of these established precedents.  For further discussion on this topic, see Nadelhoffer et al., 
supra note 79, at 93–95. 
151 Aharoni et al., supra note 120, at 6224. 
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To a cognitive neuroscientist, legal standards like “volitional capacity” and “ir-
resistible impulse” are inherently meaningless.  They do not map on to specific 
mental processes or discrete brain circuits.  In other words, legal rules that 
hinge on judgments about the human mind do not actually reference any of the 
valid species of human mental function that cognitive science has labored to 
catalog.  Conversely, cognitive science constructs such as “action cancellation” 
or “delayed reward discounting” represent valid and distinct species of cogni-
tion that can be measured reliably and precisely, yet are foreign to legal deci-
sion-makers.  There is no coherent framework for linking legal standards refer-
encing mental function to specific, quantifiable cognitive processes. 
Neuroscience and law lack a “lingua franca” of cognition that could bridge the 
conceptual chasm that exists between these disciplines.152 
Other significant concerns regarding the use of neuroscience and neu-
roprediction in a legal context are the ethical issues such studies generate.  
Perhaps realizing these concerns and the rapidity of neuroscientific advanc-
es before leaving office, President Obama charged his Bioethics Commis-
sion to “identify proactively a set of core ethical standards” in the field of 
neuroscience and charged the Commission to consider implications “relat-
ing to . . . the appropriate use of neuroscience in the criminal-justice sys-
tem.”153  In response, the MacArthur Foundation released recommendations 
for the government and courts including: “that NSF . . . and DOJ (for in-
stance through NIJ) fund studies that directly investigate the promise and 
the limitations of using neuro-technologies to add value to existing data-
driven approaches to predicting recidivism and future violence.”154  As evi-
denced by the report, applications of neuroscience in the legal field raises 
both common and novel ethical concerns.  The biggest ethical concern 
when attempting to use neuroimaging to predict future violence of recidi-
vism is the concern around interpreting, or rather identifying, false posi-
tives and negatives.155  “[P]recedents from non-neuroscientific analyses 
(such as from other types of predictive testing) can help us to anticipate 
[these types of] ethical problems and to seek solutions.”156  Novel concerns, 
 
152 Joshua Buckholtz & David L. Faigman, Promises, Promises for Neuroscience and Law, 24.18 
CURRENT BIOLOGY R861, R864 (2014), http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/ 
  S0960982214009208; See also Walter P. Sinnott-Amrmstrong, Neurolaw and Consciousness 
Detection, 47.10 CORTEX 1246, 1246–47 (2011), http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/ 
  pii/S0010945211001353?np=y (discussing the controversial use of “cognitive enhancers” to aid 
witnesses and jurors in their evaluations). 
153 Letter from President Barrack Obama to Amy Gutmann, Commission Chair, Presidential Com-
mission for the Study of Bioethical Issues (July 1, 2013), http://bioethics.gov/sites/default/files/ 
  news/Charge%20from%20President%20Obama.pdf.  See also David L. Faigman et al., Law and 
Neuroscience: Recommendations Submitted to the President’s Bioethics Commission, 1 J. L. & 
BIOSCIENCES 224, 226 (2014). 
154 Faigman et al., supra note 153, at 233. 
155 Owen D. Jones et al., Law and Neuroscience, 33 J. NEUROSCIENCE 17624, 17628 (2013), 
http://neuroethics.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Law-and-Neuro.pdf. 
156 Id. 
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as noted by some scholars, include, for example, using neuroscience to sen-
tence a convicted person to a “brain intervention instead [of] a behavioral 
interaction, such as anger management therapy.”157  If neuroimaging were 
used in terms of gun control legislation, other novel ethical concerns would 
arise.  Should the law take away a person’s right to possess a firearm just 
because a brain scan shows a suspicious abnormality when their behavior 
reveals no violent tendencies?  With brain interventions such as medication 
and fMRIs or various prediction scans, the changes bypass the person’s de-
cision-making ability, arguably infringing on his autonomy at a significant 
level.158 
Additionally, with these increasing advances in neural correlates, a new 
question arises: whether or not these potentially invasive methods raise 
constitutional issues of their own.  Although the Supreme Court has held 
that “predictions per se do not run afoul of defendants’ due process rights 
even in high stakes legal contexts,”159 the neuroimaging studies and meth-
ods incorporated in neuroprediction raise unique constitutional concerns—
particularly with the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.160  The Fourth 
Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and re-
quires either prior permission or a valid search warrant supported by prob-
able cause, unless an enumerated exception applies.161  One’s own 
body/person is undoubtedly protected by the Fourth Amendment.  There-
fore, MRIs or fMRIs, in the context of gun control legislation, could consti-
tute a search in which the government would need probable cause or con-
sent. 
Neuroscientific methods also raise Fifth Amendment concerns.  A per-
son is protected by the Fifth Amendment from being a witness against him-
self during the guilt or sentencing phase of a criminal trial.162  Presumably, 
if laws utilizing fMRI data to restrict access to guns were enacted, and 
someone broke that law and purchased a firearm illegally, use of said data 
could raise Fifth Amendment concerns.  “In Estelle v. Smith, for instance, 
the Court held that the government could not interview a prisoner before 
sentencing without warning him that he had the right to remain silent.”163  
While it is unclear whether or not the Estelle holding is limited to the spe-
cific facts of the case, one could see how such use of neuroprediction in the 




159 Nadelhoffer et al., supra note 79, at 89. 
160 Id. 
161 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
162 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
163 Nadelhoffer et al., supra note 79, at 92 (citing Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 461–69 (1981)). 
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using incriminating data found in the brain scans against the person trying 
to obtain a firearm. 
Notably, neuroprediction of violence generally does not conflict with 
current law, since it is employed in areas such as sentencing, civil com-
mitment, and sexually violent predators.164  “Violence predictions can do 
tremendous harm when mistaken, but all that shows is that the legal system 
should use the best possible methods when it relies on these predictions.”165  
As previously discussed, actuarial predictions are more reliable than clini-
cal predictions and would be a better source of reliable information.  Fur-
thermore, advances in neuroscience have led scientists to believe the accu-
racy of actuarial predictions will only improve in future years, thus 
affecting the legal world.166   
Mark Follman of Mother Jones found at least thirty-eight mass murder 
shooters over the past two decades “displayed signs of possible mental 
health problems prior to the killings.”167  Although this is a shocking, and 
perhaps frightening, statistic, it does not necessarily mean all people with a 
mental illness are dangerous; this evidence is still not enough to limit the 
rights of all individuals with a mental illness.168  For example, even if 
stricter laws were in place that inhibited these individuals from purchasing 
a firearm, they still do not address instances where the weapons are stolen 
or obtained by a friend.169  Currently, because of the lack of information 
provided by neuroscience, and other sciences, past behavior is the best pre-
dictor of future violence.  Mental health professionals are not the best peo-
ple to attest to past behavior, but rather, family members and friends are 
best equipped to provide this imperative knowledge to help determine fu-
ture dangerousness.170  This is true because often patients may not tell their 
 
164  Nadelhoffer et al., supra note 79, at 95. 
165 Id.  
166 Id. at 94. 
167 Mark Follman, Mass Shootings: Maybe What We Need Is a Better Mental-Health Policy, 
MOTHER JONES (Nov. 9, 2012, 6:03 AM), http:// www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/11/jared-
loughner-mass-shootings-mental-illness.  It appears Fullman’s data is based off of reports of 
mental illness from other news outlets and personal investigations, suggesting this figure may not 
be accurate.  However, even if it were proven to be accurate, it would not change the established, 
accepted notion or fact that not all people with mental illness are dangerous. 
168 Just as Sir William Blackstone stated, “[B]etter that ten guilty persons escape, than that one in-
nocent suffer.”  5 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358.  Many would argue that broad-
ly restricting constitutional rights in the way these categorical laws employ is far worse for jus-
tice. 
169 See Ryan Chaloner, Winton Hall & Susan Hatters Friedman, Guns, Schools, and Mental Illness: 
Potential Concerns for Physicians and Mental Health Professionals, MAYO CLINIC PROC. 1, 4 
(2013), http:// www.mayoclinicproceedings.org/article/S0025-6196(13)00736-2/fulltext (explain-
ing the recent mass shooting that occurred at a preschool in Newtown, Connecticut involved fire-
arms obtained from a family and friends). 
170 See infra Part II.D. 
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mental health professionals the entire truth, may color stories, or may hide 
certain information about their pasts.  However, family members and 
friends, who are with the mentally ill person on a daily basis, have a better 
look into whether the behavior is something worthy to generate alarm.171  
Friends and family member assessments are factors that could be incorpo-
rated into actuarial prediction models. 
D.  Mental Health Professional’s Role 
Restrictive state laws bar firearm possession by anyone who is “adjudi-
cated as a mental defective” or involuntarily committed.172  “And while 
mental illness for civil commitment purposes is technically a legal, not 
medical, concept, legislatures and courts largely incorporate the definition 
applied by mental health professionals.”173  Thus, these liberties, to a large 
extent, rest on psychiatric diagnoses in the hands of mental health profes-
sionals. 
Legislation that places the responsibility on mental health professionals 
to take away guns raises a number of different concerns.  First, there is a 
potential “chilling effect” on the therapeutic relationship.174  Numerous 
studies have shown that imposing a mandatory duty on psychologists, out-
side of immediate threats of harm to self or an individual, corresponded to 
retaliation and “distance” in the therapeutic relationship.175  Psychologists 
have also hypothesized this perceived lack of confidentiality would also de-
ter people from being completely honest with their therapist, inhibiting his 
or her ability to get an adequate diagnosis or treatment.176  These types of 
laws could have an overall chilling effect on the entire profession, and 
place these professionals in a terrible catch-22—balancing reporting obli-
gations designed to prevent murder with creating and maintaining a rela-
tionship with a patient to whom a duty of care is owed.  Even the American 
 
171 While other problems could arise by requiring family members to step into the role of mental 
health professionals, I merely add this suggestion to further clarify the problems with utilizing 
mental health professionals in this capacity. 
172 See Vars & Young, supra note 12, at 11. 
173 Vars, supra note 61, at 1636–37. 
174 Id. at 1647. 
175 Id. (citing Griffin Edwards, Tarasoff, Duty to Warn Laws, and Suicide, 34 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 1, 5 (2013)) (“One recent study found that imposing a mandatory duty on psychologists to 
warn others about threats posed by patients corresponded to a nine percent increase in teen sui-
cides.”). 
176 See generally Edward Kaufman & Marianne R.M. Yoshioka, Substance Abuse Treatment and 
Family Therapy: A Treatment Improvement Protocol Tip 39, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVS. (2004), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK64259/ (discussing how it is 
very difficult for mental health professionals to develop a treatment plan when the individual lies 
or does not inform their therapist about past actions or thoughts, and why these new laws would 
only further perpetuate that difficulty). 
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Psychiatric Association has expressed its concern about these laws on the 
profession: 
Because privacy in mental health treatment is essential to encourage persons in 
need of treatment to seek care, laws designed to limit firearm possession that 
mandate reporting to law enforcement officials by psychiatrists and other men-
tal health professionals of all patients who raise concerns about danger to them-
selves or others are likely to be counterproductive and should not be adopt-
ed.177 
These laws will also leave mental health professionals battling the negative 
stigma further perpetuated by these laws.178  These types of stereotypes 
naturally will lead people to avoid seeking treatment, resulting in anti-
therapeutic consequences and potentially more dangerous conditions for 
the general public. 
Despite all of these disadvantages for including mental health profes-
sionals in the process, there are, arguably, some advantages.  Proponents of 
these laws argue that mental health professionals are best at identifying be-
havior and attitudes that could lead to potential danger.  They argue that 
mental health professionals have more experience than the average person 
dealing with people who have mental illnesses, and therefore are better 
equipped to talk with the patient and get more accurate responses.179  As 
compared to a store owner selling the gun to a customer, a mental health 
professional is better suited to recognize certain dangerous patterns that ap-
pear on the surface that others may not see.  While there is some merit to 
these points, there are little to no empirical data to support that mental 
health professionals are more accurate when assessing future dangerous-
ness. 
E.  Second Amendment and Equal Protection 
Courts addressing laws that categorically exclude persons with a mental 
illness from obtaining a firearm typically confront two constitutional is-
sues: challenges under the Second Amendment and under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.  As previously mentioned, the Court in Heller was unclear as 
to what level of scrutiny to apply to Second Amendment challenges.180  
Although the Heller Court preferred to avoid a scrutiny-based approach al-
 
177 Rudolph, supra note 45, at 692–93; Position Statement on Firearm Access, Acts of Violence and 
the Relationship to Mental Illness and Mental Health Services, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (2014). 
178 See Lindsey Lewis, Mental Illness, Propensity for Violence, and the Gun Control Act, 11 HOUS. 
J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 149, 169 (2011) (“[There is a] stigmatization associated with labeling 
mentally ill individuals as violent offenders incapable of handling guns in a safe manner.”). 
179 Morse, supra note 11, at 217. 
180 554 U.S. at 634–35. 
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together, some circuits have debated about the correct level of scrutiny.181  
The traditional levels of scrutiny are rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, 
and strict scrutiny.182  However, the Supreme Court in Heller ruled out ra-
tional-basis in regards to Second Amendment challenges—leaving only in-
termediate and strict.183 
Some courts apply intermediate scrutiny to these and related issues, but 
there remains disagreement about how to apply intermediate scrutiny.184  
Only a minority of circuits have chosen to apply strict scrutiny.185 
The Sixth Circuit recently confronted the strict versus intermediate 
scrutiny issue with regards to firearm possession and the mentally ill.  In 
Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff’s Department, the plaintiff challenged a 
law which prohibits possession of firearms by individuals “adjudicated as a 
mental defective” or who have “been committed to a mental institution,” as 
violating his constitutional rights under the Second Amendment and the 
equal protection doctrine.186  The analysis of the three-judge panel assumed 
heightened scrutiny would not apply to the equal protection challenge.  Yet, 
on the Second Amendment issue, the panel expressed “[t]here are strong 
reasons for preferring strict scrutiny over intermediate scrutiny. . . [includ-
ing that] the Supreme Court has by now been clear and emphatic that the 
‘right to keep and bear arms’ is a ‘fundamental righ[t] necessary to our sys-
tem of ordered liberty.’”187  Tyler was vacated in April 2015 and was sub-
 
181 See, e.g., United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641–42 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc); Lauren 
Paglini, How Far Will the Strictest State Push the Limits: The Constitutionality of California’s 
Proposed Gun Law Under the Second Amendment, 23 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 459, 
466 (2015) (discussing how to analyze the constitutionality of city and state ordinances under the 
Second Amendment). 
182 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008). 
183 Id. at 628–29 n.27; see also Vars & Young, supra note 12. 
184 Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 775 F.3d 308, 324 (6th Cir. 2014); see United States v. 
Carter, 669 F.3d 411, 413 (4th Cir. 2012) (applying intermediate scrutiny to § 922(g)(3), which 
prohibits gun possession by drug addicts and unlawful users of controlled substances); United 
States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying intermediate scrutiny to 
§ 922(g)(1)’s ban on gun ownership by felons).  For examples of disagreement over how to apply 
intermediate scrutiny, see, e.g., United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2011) (apply-
ing a form of intermediate scrutiny to a “categorical ban on gun ownership by a class of individ-
uals,” which required a “strong showing, necessitating a substantial relationship between the re-
striction and an important governmental objective”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United 
States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470–71 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying intermediate scrutiny to 
laws burdening the right to bear arms “outside of the home” but applying strict scrutiny to laws 
surrounding the “core right of self-defense in the home”); see generally Vars & Young, supra 
note 12. 
185 Tyler, 775 F.3d at 328 (“In choosing strict scrutiny, we join a significant, increasingly emergent 
though, as yet, minority view . . . .”). 
186 Id. at 344 (“The government’s interest in keeping firearms out of the hands of the mentally ill is 
not sufficiently related to depriving the mentally healthy, who had a distant episode of commit-
ment, of their constitutional rights.”). 
187 Id. at 326. 
762 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 19:3 
 
sequently argued before the entire Sixth Circuit en banc.188  At rehearing, 
the court held Tyler had a viable claim under the Second Amendment and 
that the government had not justified a lifetime ban on gun possession by 
anyone who had been “adjudicated as a mental defective” or “committed to 
a mental institution,” or the “categorical” type of restriction previously dis-
cussed.189 
To come to this conclusion, the court analyzed the situation under a 
two-part test addressed in United States v. Greeno.190  The first step places 
the burden on the government to show “whether the challenged law bur-
dens conduct that falls within the scope of the Second Amendment right, as 
historically understood,”191  meaning “laws . . . [that] regulate activity fall-
ing outside the terms of the right as publicly understood when the Bill of 
Rights was ratified” will survive constitutional scrutiny.192  The court in Ty-
ler agreed with the district court that the “historical evidence cited by Hel-
ler and [the government] does not directly support the proposition that per-
sons who were once committed due to mental illness are forever ineligible 
to regain their Second Amendment rights.”193 
The court then assessed the second prong of the Greeno test, and pro-
ceeded to analyze “the strength of the government’s justification for re-
stricting or regulating the exercise of Second Amendment rights,”194 to de-
termine the appropriate level of scrutiny.195  The court concluded 
intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard and reversed and re-
manded to the district court.196 
Although the Tyler court made clear the majority of circuit courts now 
apply an intermediate standard, it also clarified that courts are split on ex-
actly how to apply intermediate scrutiny to these issues.  However, as evi-
denced by this case, it is unlikely that such categorical exclusions—such as 
banning anyone with a mental illness from possessing a firearm—would 
survive either strict or intermediate scrutiny. 
Such strict categorical exclusion laws also arguably violate the Equal 
Protection Clause.  The Equal Protection Clause, which is part of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,197 provides that no 
state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction “the equal protection of 
 
188 Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016). 
189 Id. at 699. 
190  679 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012). 
191 Id. at 518. 
192 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
193 Tyler, 837 F.3d at 689. 
194 Greeno, 679 F.3d at 518. 
195 Tyler, 837 F.3d at 686. 
196 Id. at 692. 
197 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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the laws.”198  Laws impacting individuals who are members of a protected 
class are assessed under a heightened level of legal scrutiny.  What consti-
tutes a protected class has fluctuated throughout the course of history.199  
Although traditionally and in many contexts the mentally ill were not con-
sidered part of a protected class, court decisions have provided that protec-
tion, and therefore, laws impacting mentally ill persons have been subject 
to higher scrutiny standards than of that in the past.200  Laws that treat 
“former mental health patients . . . differently than others similarly situat-
ed . . . without any logical justification for doing so”201 are often held to be 
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.202 
Here, there is no logical justification for barring certain persons with 
mental illness from obtaining a firearm because there is limited sound sci-
ence, and statistical support, to justify the government rationale, as evi-
denced by previous sections of this Comment.  When dealing with these 
laws that categorically exclude persons with mental illnesses from obtain-
ing a firearm, once heightened scrutiny is applied, the ban runs afoul of the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
To the extent that the mentally ill are treated as a protected class, justi-
fying higher levels of scrutiny of laws infringing on their gun rights, the 
laws that categorically exclude anyone with a mental illness from pos-
sessing a firearm are presumptively unconstitutional on two grounds.  The 
asserted policy rationale may be reflective of the popular, but empirically 
unsupported assumption that all persons with a mental illness are danger-
ous. 
CONCLUSION 
Alternative models to the categorical approach currently employed by 
some states, such as the symptoms-based approach, which focuses on be-
havior when addressing the issue of whether an individual’s Second 
 
198 Id. at § 1. 
199 See Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Disability, Equal Protection, and the Supreme Court: 
Standing at the Crossroads of Progressive and Retrogressive Logic in Constitutional Classifica-
tion, 35 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 81, 82–84 (Fall 2001–Winter 2002) (discussing a history of the 
Equal Protection Clause and how certain classes, including gender and race, came to be includ-
ed). 
200 See id. at 111.  See also Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 347–49 (1993) (finding constitutional dif-
ferent statutory schemes for involuntary civil commitment of those with intellectual disabilities 
(clear and convincing) and those with mental disorders (beyond a reasonable doubt)); see, e.g., 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 438, 440 (1985) (discussing heightened 
rational basis standard of review for persons with mental illnesses). 
201 Steven W. Dulan, State of Madness: Mental Health and Gun Regulations, 31 T.M. COOLEY L. 
REV. 1, 7 (2014). 
202 See Silvers & Stein, supra note 199, at 87. 
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Amendment rights should be limited, or models that incorporate actuarial 
prediction, are better methods to protect not only the individual’s civil lib-
erties, but also the community.  Such models will be less of a deterrent for 
people seeking psychological help, and therefore, may be more effective in 
keeping guns away from those people who really should not have them. 
Advocates for a symptoms-based or behavioral-based approach assert 
that this will more effectively impact future gun violence for three reasons: 
it is less discriminatory, more predictable, and more accurate and effec-
tive.203  Actuarial methods promise similar benefits. 
Current reliance on a clinical diagnosis is inadequate to predict future 
violence.  An actuarial approach would provide more accurate prediction 
methods.  While there are some practical concerns about incorporating such 
a requirement into current state legislation, an actuarial requirement would 
be a more effective safeguard on constitutional rights, since many tools 
such as the COVR have a better predictive rate than that of clinical psycho-
logical professionals and involve looking at an individual’s behavior.  
While the field of neuroscience may eventually yield greater accuracy and 
enhanced prediction abilities, such developments are in their infant stages, 
and are not yet adequate to pass legal standards.  Furthermore, use of such 
disciplines may raise constitutional questions of their own—particularly 
with regards to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.  Until neuroscience de-
velops the tools to predict such violent behavior with accuracy that also 
passes constitutional muster, authorities are forced to place excessive re-
sponsibility into the hands of mental health professionals who are torn be-
tween their duty to their client and their responsibility to public safety.  
However, perhaps a better indicator and more reliable measure to attempt 
to predict and protect would be to hone in on behavior, and specifically, on 
certain symptoms that are known triggers of violence.204  There are certain 
symptoms, regardless of whether there is a diagnosis, that signify a greater 
propensity for violence.205 
Categorical approaches embedded in recent state legislation allow fear, 
however understandable, to create policy that directly implicates the rights 
of the mentally ill under both the Second Amendment and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.  Adopting a new approach, either adding an actuarial com-
 
203 Rudolph, supra note 45, at 698. 
204 Morse, supra note 11, at 225 (“Diagnoses will not independently answer the predictive questions 
about craziness or legally relevant conduct, although the behavioral data upon which they are 
based may be of help.  Indeed, behavioral and demographic variables, especially past history, are 
far more likely to be valid predictors than purely clinical and psychopathological variables or di-
agnoses.”). 
205 Vars, supra note 61, at 1639–40 (“Delusions and hallucinations appear to have been present in a 
string of recent mass shootings, including those in the Navy Yard, Aurora, and Tucson.  The data 
suggest that the relationship between delusions and violence is not merely anecdotal.”). 
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ponent to the statute or simply focusing on behavior and not diagnosis, will 
ensure the most protection: both for the individual and the general public, 
until neuroscientists develop perhaps an even better solution. 
